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INTRODUCTION
Misconduct is the most common ground for dismissal, and this refers to unacceptable behaviour of an employee 
which may be categorised into three  sub-headings, namely misconduct related to duty, misconduct related to 
discipline and misconduct related to immorality. Whilst the employer may establish guidelines of what constitutes 
gross misconduct and the consequences if an employee engages in any of the listed misconduct that does not 
necessarily mean that serious misconduct has automatically occurred. In every case before deciding whether 
serious misconduct has occurred, the employer must consider all the facts and the employee’s response. Further, 
in determining whether the misconduct merits dismissal from employment the employer must prove that the 
wrongful conduct of the worker was sufficiently serious that it undermines the trust and confidence that the 
employer has in the employee. In this regard, before termination of employment relationship, the rule of natural 
justice must be observed in the sense that the accused employee must be informed of the charges levelled against 
him and must to be accorded the right to be heard. Having said the above, this paper discusses the concept of 
workplace misconduct and the requirement of a domestic or due inquiry to establish the alleged act and with 
reference to the practice in Malaysia. The issues considered herein are as follows: (a) whether the disciplinary or 
domestic inquiry is essential in an impending dismissal for alleged gross misconduct; and (b) whether the dismissal 
carried out without convening a disciplinary inquiry violates the principles of natural justice thereby rendering the 
dismissal unfair.
 
At this juncture it is worthwhile to note that the Court of Appeal in Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan 
Pendidikan & Anor have stated, inter alia, that art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution was considered the fountain of 
justice in regards to right to livelihood.1 In this case Gopal Sri Ram JCA, created a novel jurisprudence narrative on 
principle of natural justice2 in relation to the  principle of procedural fairness and the constitutional rights of a civil 
servant.3 The implication and acceptance of this case shows that there is a duty to observe the rules of fairness as 
a prequalification to the lawful employment of a statutory authority.
 WORKPLACE MISCONDUCT
The main mechanism to implement an employer-employee relationship is the contract of employment. The contents 
of contract lay out the rights and duties of both parties to the contract. Certainly, from an ethical and moral point of 
view, these terms and conditions in the contract of employment are there to ensure an equal bargaining power 
between the employer and the employee and maintain harmony at workplace. However, in relation to misconduct, 
the obligations of the employee are not only laid out in the contract of employment but also the company’s 
handbook. More often than not, when one peruses through the handbook, the nature of misconduct varies 
depending on the position and nature of work. In as much as a contract of employment or for that matter of fact the 
company handbook is there to ensure equality at workplace, however many a time it may not be the case. 
Employers are seen always to have an upper hand4 in the drafting of the employment contact and also the 
company handbook, therefore in many cases of misconduct the employer are seen to be in a stronger position that 
creates an unequal bargaining power.5 
In this regards it is important to revisit the definition given by definition of misconduct. The above term simply means 
an act or omission which is inconsistent with the fulfilment of the express or implied terms and conditions of an 
employee’s contract of service. It is also known as a form of improper behaviour or an intentional wrongdoing or a 
deliberate violation of a rule or standard of behaviour. The conduct of the employee may involve either gross  
negligence or a deliberate departure from accepted standards.6 The wrongdoing of the employee must be 
detrimental to the property and reputation of the employer as well as their business concern.
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Black’s Law dictionary defines ‘misconduct’ as ‘a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a 
forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, wilful in character, improper or wrong behaviour’.7 Again, 
Prem’s Judicial Dictionary states that the two criteria that must be established for misconduct are: firstly, the 
intentional doing of something which the doer knows to be wrong; and secondly, which he does recklessly, nor 
caring what the result would be.8 
The courts in Malaysia have also attempted to define misconduct, for example in Plaat Ruber Sdn Bhd v Goh Chok 
Guan,9 where the Industrial Court stated: ‘Misconduct means such act or conduct as adversely affects employees’ 
duties towards the employer. The misconduct complained of must have the same relations with the employees’ 
duties or the work entrusted to him by the employer or his competency to perform the same. Any breach of an 
express or implied duty on the part of the employee, unless it is a trifling nature, would amount to misconduct’. 
Again, in Holiday Inn, Kuching, Sarawak v Puan Elizabeth Lee Chai Siok, Sarawak,10 misconduct was defined as 
any conduct inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duties or any breach of the express or implied duties of an 
employee towards his employer. In Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Sdn Bhd v Transport Workers Union,11 
misconduct was defined as ‘conduct so seriously in breach of the accepted practice that by standard of fairness and 
justice the employer should not be bound to continue the employment’.
The courts in other jurisdiction such as the English courts had also attempted to define the above term. English 
common law defined the relationship between an employer and an employee as that of master and servant. Lord 
Esher MR in Pearce v Foster12 stated that:
The rule of law is, that where a person has entered into the position of servant, if he does anything incompatible with the 
due or faithful discharge of his duty to his master, the latter has a right to dismiss him. The relation of master and servant 
implies necessarily that the servant shall be in a position to perform his duty duly and faithfully, and if by his own act he 
prevents himself from doing so, the master may dismiss him.
In Pearce v Foster,13 Lopes, LJ stated: ‘If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with faithful discharge of 
his duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That misconduct, according to my view, 
need not be misconduct in carrying of the service or the business. It is sufficient if it is conduct which is prejudicial 
or is likely to be prejudicial to the interests or to the reputation of the master and the master will be justified, not only 
if he discovered at the time, but also if he discovers it afterwards, in dismissing that servant’.
Again, in Clouston & Co v Corry,14 Lord Hereford stated: ‘There is no fixed rule of law defining the degree of 
misconduct which will justify dismissal. Of course, there may be misconduct in a servant which will not justify the 
determination of the contract of service by one of the parties to it against the will of the other. On the other hand, 
misconduct inconsistent with the fulfilment of the express or implied conditions of service will justify dismissal’.
 
As from the above, misconduct refers to an improper behaviour, intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of 
rules or standard of behaviour. The conduct of an employee is inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duties, 
or breach of the express or implied duties of an employee towards his employer and that such acts or conduct of 
the employee adversely affects his or her duties towards the employer.
Having said the above, it is noteworthy that it would be wrong to assume that any misconduct on the part of an 
employee would warrant dismissal from employment. In fact, misconduct can be categorised into gross or serious 
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misconduct and minor misconduct. To justify dismissal the misconduct must be sufficiently serious that it 
undermines the trust and confidence of the employer towards the employee. The examples of gross misconduct 
include, but are not limited to, misuse of drugs and alcohol, theft, dishonesty, harassment and discrimination 
towards other employees, customers or the  employer, negligence, absenteeism, insubordination, leaking 
confidential information, internet abuse and conflict of interest.
Meanwhile, minor misconduct refers to employee’s offensive conduct such as late-coming, sleeping on duty, and 
continuously breaching company’s rules and regulations which in most circumstances would not warrant 
termination from employment for a single act but may instigate the issuance of a warning letter. However, an 
employee who habitually comes late to work despite being repeatedly warned and counselled by the employer 
would be deemed to have committed a gross misconduct and thus, justifying his dismissal. In addition, sleeping on 
duty may also constitute a gross misconduct. BR Ghaiye’s in his book entitled Misconduct in Employment (3rd Ed) 
at p 930 states as follows:
Sleeping on duty has always been regarded as indiscipline and dereliction of duty. Under some Standing Orders, it is a 
serious misconduct entailing dismissal. Sleeping on duty is a misconduct. Coupled with past misconduct, even though 
resulting in minor punishments, it becomes grave misconduct. A workman was found lying fast asleep on duty at his 
working place. On three earlier occasions also, he was found guilty of misconduct but only some minor punishments had 
been imposed. Taking into consideration his past conduct, it was held to be major misconduct.
While the list of serious and minor misconduct being subjective and might vary depending on the nature of each 
business, whether or not the misconduct warrants dismissal is determined with reference to the facts and 
circumstances of each individual case. Generally, reference is made to the nature and degree of the alleged 
misbehaviour; its significance in relation to the employer and to the position held by the employee; its effect on the 
confidential relationship between the parties as against the severe consequence of dismissal; and the misconduct 
must be such that it goes to the heart or root of the contract between the parties.15 In some cases, a single act of 
misconduct may justify instant dismissal especially when the misconduct is such that ‘it goes to the root of the 
contractual relation of master and servant so as to indicate unwillingness on the part of the servant to be bound 
upon his original terms of contract’.16 
It is also worth noting that the punishment meted out against the employee for the alleged misconduct has to be 
proportionate with the nature and gravity of his action or deed.17 Misconduct of a serious nature such as 
insubordination,  falsifying company documents, theft of the employer’s property, violating the company’s security or 
safety regulations or any substantive violation, may result in dismissal from employment.
The burden is on the employer to justify the dismissal, namely, that they had just cause and excuse for dismissing 
the worker.18 This is in line with the International Labour Organization’s Convention No 158 of 1982 art 8(2)(a) 
which provides that the burden of proving the existence of a valid reason for the termination shall rest on the 
employer. The quantum of proof is on the balance of probabilities, even if the misconduct complained of is of a 
criminal nature, such as theft, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust and cheating, among others. The 
court does not require the employer to prove their case against the employee beyond reasonable doubt as in a 
criminal trial before the ordinary courts of law. The term ‘balance of probabilities’ simply means: ‘if the evidence is 
such that the tribunal can say: ‘we think it more probable than not’, the burden is discharged, but, if the probabilities 
are equal, it is not.19 
 MISCONDUCT: DISCIPLINARY INQUIRY
The International Labour Organisation’s Termination of Employment Convention No 158 of 198220 provides, inter 
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alia, that an employee cannot be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination, which is connected 
to the capacity, conduct of the worker, or based on the operational requirement of the undertaking, establishment or 
service.21 The circumstances which does not constitute valid termination is mentioned in article 5 namely, union 
membership or participation in union activities outside working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within 
working hours; seeking office as, or acting or having acted in the capacity of, a workers’ representative; the filing of 
a complaint or the participation in proceedings against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulations 
or recourse to competent administrative authorities; race, colour, sex, marital status, family responsibilities, 
pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin and absence  from work during maternity 
leave. Article 6 separately provides that temporary absence from work due to illness or injury shall not constitute a 
valid reason for termination
The employee’s right to be heard in the event of termination for reasons related to his conduct or performance is 
emphasised in article 722 and the burden of proof to show the existence of a valid termination is on the employer.23 
This implies that a person whose rights are affected must have a reasonable notice of the case he has to meet; he 
must have reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence; it should be heard by an impartial tribunal; and 
lastly, the tribunal should act fairly, impartially and reasonably.24 
In relation to the above, the Industrial Relations Act 1967 provides that a workman cannot be dismissed save and 
except with just cause or excuse. The terms ‘just cause or excuse’ connotes that an impending dismissal must be 
substantively justified and procedurally fair. Substantive justification relates to the capacity or qualification of the 
employee for performing the work he was employed to do by the employer, the employee was redundant or that it 
related to conduct of the employee. While procedural fairness requires that a person whose rights are affected must 
have a reasonable notice of the case he has to meet; a reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence; trial 
by an impartial tribunal, who is neither directly nor indirectly a party to the case or has interest in the matter; and 
that the authority or tribunal should act fairly, impartially and reasonably.25 In the context of employment law, before 
an employee could be dismissed from employment, the rule of natural justice must be observed in the sense that 
the accused employee must be informed of the charge levelled against him and is given the right to be heard.
In relation to workplace misconduct, before appropriate disciplinary action is taken against an affected employee, 
the employer is required to hold a domestic enquiry or due inquiry and observe the principle of natural justice 
namely, that the accused employee must be given a fair chance to challenge the  charges levelled against him; to 
present evidence of his own choice; to cross-examine the company’s evidence; and to explain his point of view 
without any pressure or fear. The enquiry must be conducted before an impartial tribunal. If the alleged misconduct 
is established based on the evidence presented, the punishment imposed must be proportionate to the gravity of 
the misconduct.26 As noted earlier, this article addresses the issue as to whether the disciplinary or domestic inquiry 
is essential in an impending dismissal for alleged gross misconduct and whether the dismissal carried out without 
convening a disciplinary inquiry violates the principles of natural justice thereby rendering the dismissal unfair.
 DISMISSAL WITHOUT DOMESTIC INQUIRY: WHETHER FAILURE TO CONVENE FATAL OR A MERE 
IRREGULARITY?
Prior to the decision of Dreamland Corporation (M) Sdn Bhd v Choong Chin Sooi & Anor,27 the courts in Malaysia 
have been saying that the absence of a domestic inquiry was considered fatal, resulting in the dismissal being 
without just cause or excuse. This is also provided in s 14 of the Employment Act 1955 namely, that the employer 
must conduct an immediate investigation and, if the complaint is established and upon the recommendation of the 
panel of domestic inquiry, take appropriate action against the accused employee. The same is also fortified by the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 20(1) which uses the term ‘dismissal without just cause or excuse’ and as discussed 
earlier, it implies that an impending dismissal must be substantive, justified and procedurally fair.
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However, after Dreamland Corporation’s decision, failure to hold a domestic inquiry or a defective inquiry was a 
mere irregularity curable by de novo proceedings before the Industrial Court. In Dreamland’s case, at the Industrial 
Court level, it was evident that no domestic inquiry was held. The Industrial Court proceeded to hold its own inquiry 
as to whether the dismissal of the claimant was without just cause or excuse. The court found in favour of the 
claimant and accordingly awarded him monetary compensation. The High Court affirmed the decision of the 
Industrial Court. In relation to the failure to hold a domestic inquiry, the Supreme Court stated: ‘Absence of a 
domestic inquiry or the presence of a defective domestic inquiry is not a fatality, but  merely an irregularity. It is 
open to the employer to justify his action before the Industrial Court, by leading all relevant evidence before it, and 
by having the entire matter open before the court’.
In arriving at the above conclusion, the Supreme Court had relied on the ratio in Workmen of the Motipur Sugar 
Factory Private Limited v The Motipur Sugar Factory Private Limited,28 an Indian case, and British Labour Pump Co 
Ltd v Byrne,29 an English Employment Appeal Tribunal’s decision. In Motipur Sugar Factory’s case it was held that: 
'Where an employer has failed to make an inquiry before dismissing or discharging a workman, it is open to him to 
justify his action before the tribunal by leading all relevant evidence before it. The entire matter would be open 
before the tribunal. It will have jurisdiction not only to go into the limited questions open to the tribunal where 
domestic inquiry has been properly held, but also to satisfy itself on the facts adduced before it by the employer 
whether the dismissal or discharge was justified. The important effect of omission to hold an enquiry is merely that 
the tribunal would not have to consider whether there was a prima facie case but would decide for itself on the 
evidence adduced whether the charges have really been made out’.
In British Labour Pump Co Ltd v Byrne, the Employment Appeal Tribunal stated: ‘Where an employer has not 
followed a proper procedure, the right approach is for the Industrial Tribunal to ask two questions. First, have the 
employers shown on the balance of probabilities that they would have taken the same course had they held an 
inquiry, and had they received the same information which that inquiry would have produced? Second, have the 
employers shown that in the light of the information which they would have had, had they gone through the proper 
procedure, they would have been behaving reasonably in still deciding to dismiss?’.
The principal of Dreamland’s case was cited with approval by the Federal Court in Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat 
Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd and another appeal,30 where it was stated, inter alia, that failure by the employer 
to hold an inquiry could be cured by a hearing before the Industrial Court. Mohamad Azmi FCJ, delivering the 
judgment of the Federal Court, stated: ‘In our opinion, Dreamland did not belittle the importance of complying with 
any statutory or contractual enquiry before dismissal in all master and servant cases outside the purview of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967. What Dreamland,  following the curable principle in Motipur and Calvin laid down, 
was that failure on the part of the employer to hold a proper domestic inquiry should not deprive the Industrial Court 
of jurisdiction nor excuse it from the obligation to hear the reference on its merits. We therefore could not find any 
reason to reject the two authorities. In any event, we held the view that once a case of wrongful dismissal had been 
properly referred by the Minister under s 20(3), the Industrial Court was seized with jurisdiction and was obliged 
under the Act to determine the dispute on its merits. Thus, even where there was a breach of contractual or 
statutory obligation to hold an inquiry, the Industrial Court should proceed to determine on the merits first, whether 
the misconduct complained of was in fact committed by the employee, and secondly, whether the nature and extent 
of the misconduct could constitute just cause or excuse for the dismissal’.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dreamland Corp and the Federal Court’s decision in Wong Yuen Hock had been 
followed both by the civil courts and the Industrial Court thereby dispensing the requirement of a domestic inquiry in 
an impending dismissal.31 In Sil Ad (Johor Bahru) Sdn Bhd v Hilton Oswald Franciscus,32 Abdul Malik Ishak J stated 
that: 'there was no necessity for the company to conduct an inquiry before terminating the employment. It was 
sufficient for the company to lead evidence before the Industrial Court to show reasons for the termination. It is 
therefore respectfully submitted that the domestic inquiry being defective is not ipso facto fatal. The court is still at 
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liberty to decide on the issue based upon evidence adduced'. Again, in Ganesan G Suppiah v Mount Pleasure Corp 
Sdn Bhd,33 the High Court stated that the Industrial Court provides an impartial forum and the minister’s reference 
should be viewed as a hearing de novo by an independent statutory tribunal. In  particular, Abdul Kadir Sulaiman J 
stated: ‘Invariably, the hearing before the Industrial Court itself which indeed provides a better and impartial forum 
for the employee than most domestic tribunals, should be taken as sufficient opportunity for the employee to be 
heard to satisfy natural justice and thereby rectify any omission to hold any domestic inquiry. Indeed, the Minister’s 
reference should be viewed as a hearing de novo by an independent statutory tribunal’.
Likewise, in Asiatic Development Bhd v Kanesan a/l Manayah and Anor,34 the court took the view that it should not 
be concerned with the domestic inquiry held by the employer. In particular, Abdul Kadir Sulaiman J stated: 'The 
Industrial Court when carrying out its duty in hearing the reference by the Minister ought not to be influenced by the 
fact that a domestic inquiry was held by an employer before dismissing his workman. Were it otherwise, the guilt or 
innocence of a workman upon a charge of misconduct would be decided not by the Industrial Court, but by the 
employer himself. That, with all respect, is not the purpose for which Parliament went through the elaborate process 
of legislating the Act and setting up a special machinery for the vindication of the rights of workmen'.
In light of the above, failure to hold a domestic inquiry or one that is flawed or defective is not fatal to the company’s 
case. It is curable in the sense that at the trial before the Industrial Court, the unfair dismissal claim would be heard 
afresh and on merits. It must be added that where a domestic inquiry was held by the company, the findings of the 
domestic inquiry panel are not binding on the Industrial Court. It is common for the Industrial Court to take into 
consideration the panel’s findings when determining whether or not an employee has been dismissed with or 
without just cause or excuse.35 The court would also inquire whether the domestic inquiry applied the correct 
procedure and had reached the correct conclusion having regard to all the evidence adduced before the inquiry 
panel. In Metroplex Administration Sdn Bhd v Mohamed Elias,36 the High Court noted that where a domestic inquiry 
was held, the Industrial Court should first consider the procedure adopted at the inquiry and its findings and that a 
failure to do so would constitute an error of law. Low Hop Bing J (as he then was) stated:
Where a domestic inquiry is held and the rules of natural justice have been applied, the Industrial Court should first 
consider the adequacy or otherwise of the procedure adopted in the proceedings for the domestic inquiry in order to 
determine whether the domestic inquiry has applied the correct procedure and reached the correct conclusion having 
regard to all the evidence, documentary and oral, adduced at the domestic inquiry. If at the domestic inquiry, the rules of 
natural justice were properly applied, the employee being given the opportunity to be heard and to present his case, and 
should a finding be made against the employee based on the evidence which was presented to the domestic inquiry, the 
Industrial Court ought to consider the finding of the domestic inquiry in order to conclude whether the employee has been 
dismissed without just cause or excuse. The rule that a domestic inquiry should be held is after all a rule of the court’s own 
devising.
Again, in Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Bhd v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor,37 Raus Sharif J (as he then 
was) stated: ‘Where due inquiry has been held … the Industrial Court should first consider whether or not the 
domestic inquiry was valid and whether the inquiry notes are accurate. In the absence of such consideration and a 
finding on the validity of the domestic inquiry and accuracy of the inquiry notes, the Industrial Court’s action in 
proceeding to decide the matter without any regard to the notes of inquiry cannot be described as anything more 
than an error of law’. As from the above, where a domestic inquiry was held by the employer, then so long as the 
rules of natural justice had been properly observed, the employee given an opportunity to be heard and the finding 
arrived at was based on the evidence presented at the domestic inquiry, the duty of the court is merely to consider 
the findings of inquiry panel with a view to decide whether the decision of the panel was perverse or otherwise.38 
In addition, it must be noted that as far as employees who fall within the ambit of the Employment Act, s 14(1) 
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mandates that a ‘due inquiry’ has to be held before dismissal. In Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong She Yen39 per Mohd 
Azmi bin Kamaruddin FCJ (delivering the judgment of the court held as follows:
[1] …
[2] The initial defect in natural justice in not holding a statutory or contractual domestic inquiry is 'curable' by the inquiry held 
by the Industrial Court itself. Industrial Court could not therefore shy away from determining the two issues required to be 
determined in dismissal cases under s 20 reference. In omitting to  carry out its basic functions, the Industrial Court in the 
present appeal had clearly committed a jurisdictional error. It follows that the learned High Court Judge, in dismissing the 
appellant’s application, had fallen into similar error.
[3] The requirement of due inquiry before dismissal by s 14(1) of the Employment Act for employees whose earning did not 
exceed RM1,250 per month, could not by mere inference change the policy of the law in s 20 of the Industrial Relations Act. 
There is no basis in law to hold that the defect in natural justice could only be cured if the workman earned more than 
RM1,250 per month. The principle of curability should not be limited to certain category of workmen depending on their 
salary.
[4] In the absence of clear words by Parliament, the Court must hold that none of the Amending Acts to the Employment 
Act 1955 viz Act A 91/1971, Act A 360/1976, and Act A 497/1980, was intended to alter the policy of the law under the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967.
 ABSENCE OF DOMESTIC INQUIRY NOT A FATALITY BUT A MERE IRREGULARITY: WHETHER 
COMPATIBLE WITH MALAYSIA INDUSTRIAL JURISPRUDENCE
What is apparent from the above discussion is that it is not compulsory for the company to hold a domestic inquiry 
before dismissing an employee for alleged misconduct. In other words, the failure by the employer to conduct a due 
inquiry process will not constitute a dismissal without just cause or excuse. In Wong Yuen Hock’s case, Mohd Azmi 
FCJ noted, inter alia, that the Industrial Court was not competent to declare the dismissal void for failure to comply 
with the rules of natural justice. Again, in Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Seh Yen, 40 the Federal Court noted that the 
High Court and the Industrial Court fell into similar error when it held that the claimant was dismissed without just 
cause or excuse purely on violation of the principles natural justice and the failure to hold a domestic inquiry.
It is sufficient for the employer to lead evidence before the Industrial Court to show the reasons for the dismissal 
and with an opportunity given to the employee to rebut the allegations against him. The very purpose of an inquiry 
before the Industrial Court is to give both the disputants an opportunity to be heard. The court will determine 
whether the misconduct complained of has been established and whether the proven misconduct constitutes 
dismissal  with just cause or excuse. As aptly stated by Mohamad Azmi FCJ in Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong 
Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd and another appeal:41 
Invariably, the hearing before the Industrial Court itself which indeed provides a better and impartial forum for the employee 
than most domestic tribunals, should be taken as sufficient opportunity for the employee to be heard to satisfy natural 
justice and thereby rectify any omission to hold any domestic inquiry. Indeed, the Minister’s reference should be viewed as 
a hearing de novo by an independent statutory tribunal. In our view, this was a far cry from saying that a statutory or 
contractual requirement for a pre-dismissal inquiry could be totally ignored in all disputes involving master and servant, 
even though outside the parameter of s 20. In the circumstances, we failed to understand the complaint of the Industrial 
Court that for it to inquire into the merits the question of ‘ just cause or excuse’ would be ‘ grossly unfair’. Carrying out one’s 
function could not possibly be described as an unfair exercise.
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Whilst it is not disputed that the hearing before the Industrial Court would provide an opportunity for the employee to 
be heard, the real question is whether this approach is compatible with the industrial jurisprudence in Malaysia. To 
succumb to the courts approach as above would be akin of adopting the common law master and servant principles 
namely, that an employee who had committed gross misconduct may be dismissed summarily and without notice. 
The burden of proving misconduct justifying dismissal is on the employer who should lead evidence at the trial 
before the Industrial Court, should the case be referred to the court by the Minister pursuant to s 20(3) of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967. In fact, at common law the employer is free to dismiss an employee on any grounds 
with no obligation to reveal the reason for the dismissal42 and the employer may even rely on the reasons for 
dismissal discovered subsequent to the dismissal.43 Therefore,  applying the principles of Dreamland Corp and 
Wong Yuen Hock, employer is free to fire an employee without assigning reasons for the dismissal nor according 
the employee the right to be heard, hence, dispensing the rules of natural justice.
As stated earlier, at common law, an employment relationship may be ended by giving the employee an appropriate 
notice of termination or payment in lieu thereof. However, pursuant to s 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, 
the employer must follow the requirements of establishing substantive justification and procedural fairness. In fact, 
the Act makes no distinction between a termination and a dismissal as either must be with just cause or excuse. 
The Federal Court had, in Dr A Dutt v Assunta Hospital,44 stated, inter alia, that the so called ‘termination 
simpliciter’, a termination by contractual notice and for no reason must still be grounded on just cause or excuse.
It is also worthwhile noting that pursuant to s 20(1) of the IRA, a workman who alleges that his dismissal was 
without just cause or excuse, has to file his written representation at the office of the Director General not later than 
60 days from the moment he considers himself to have been dismissed without just cause or excuse. The 
representation will then pass different levels, namely, the conciliatory level (where the Director General of the 
Industrial Relations Department (IRD) seeks to conciliate over the dispute), reporting level (where the Director 
General reports to the Minister after finding the dispute irreconcilable), referral level (where the Minister decides 
whether or not to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court), and the adjudicatory level at the Industrial Court.
Upon receiving the representation from the workman, the Industrial Relations Department will invite the disputants 
for a conciliation meeting. The officer of IRD will act as a facilitator where his task is essentially to convene the 
parties to resolve their differences, to find points of common interest and defuse tension. He will allow the parties to 
express their views, will examine the statement of the case made by the parties, and deliver an opinion as to the 
best or most likely outcome of the dispute. The parties, however, retain the right to say whether they do or do not 
accept any suggested settlement. The conciliator does not make decision on the merits of the case or recommend 
the acceptance of any possible solution. It is up to the parties concerned to reach a final agreement on any 
proposed settlement.
When an alleged dismissal was carried out without due inquiry and with no reasons assigned, it would be obvious 
that the conciliation meeting would not be so effective. Instead of being a forum for amicable settlement of the 
dispute, the conciliation meeting would become a mere hurdle for the parties to pass for purposes of reference to 
the Industrial Court. It is reiterated that while conciliation does not guarantee a settlement, it is an essential feature 
of our industrial relations, a very positive method of resolving disputes without the need to use a more formal 
process. Therefore, if the basic tenets of fairness in an impending dismissal are properly followed, including 
conducting a due inquiry into the allegation made against the employee and accord the employee a chance to 
vindicate himself at the inquiry, the conciliation meeting will then become more effective in the sense that the 
conciliator would have a clearer understanding of the dispute and thus, able to effectively communicate with the 
parties with a view of arriving at an amicable solution.
It may be further added that where the conciliation fails to arrive at an amicable solution, the Director General will 
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refer the matter to the Minister who in turn will determine whether the representation merits referred to the Industrial 
Court for an award. The courts have repeatedly said that the Minister’s discretion under the s 20(3) of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1967 may be questioned by certiorari when the Minister acted ultra vires, unfairly or unjustly, or where 
there were flaws in his decision-making process.45 In Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan46 the 
Court of Appeal stated inter alia, that if the Minister decided not to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court, he 
should give reasons for his decision, because a workers right to livelihood is involved. If he gives no reasons, or 
gives inadequate reasons, it is open to the court to infer that the Minster had no good reason for the decision he 
made. It is important therefore for the Minister to exercise his discretion sparingly without any improper motive and 
not to take into account extraneous or irrelevant matters.47 
It follows that where there is a challenge by way of certiorari of the exercise of the discretion by the Minister under s 
20(3) of the IRA the High Court will undertake a meticulous examination of the facts that were made available to the 
Minister. If the examination reveals that the representations made under  s 20(1) of IRA were neither perverse or 
frivolous, nor vexatious, or if it raised serious questions of fact or law calling for adjudication, a decision not to refer 
is liable to be quashed by an order of certiorari. In other words, where the dispute raises questions of law, the 
proper forum to decide on this is the Industrial Court, and not the Minister.48 If however, the representation is clearly 
trivial, frivolous or vexations, the Minister’s refusal to refer the representation to the Industrial Court will not be 
interfered.
The question arises namely, how would the minister make a decision to refer or otherwise the representation to the 
Industrial Court when the due inquiry has been dispensed with? It is submitted that without a domestic inquiry, the 
Minister’s reference of the representation to the Industrial Court would become a merely procedural formality. This 
is primarily because the Minister would not be able to sufficiently digest whether the representation merits reference 
to the Industrial Court.
It is further submitted that the superior courts approach in Dreamland Corporation and Wong Yuen Hock may be 
tenable if there is an automatic reference of dismissal cases to the Industrial Court. Undoubtedly, the Industrial 
Court would indeed provide a better and impartial forum for the employee to raise objection to his dismissal. In 
other words, where there is a complaint against the employer for unfair dismissal or where there has been 
victimisation or unfair labour practice or violation of the principle of natural justice, or where the decision to dismiss 
was baseless or perverse, the matter ought to be adjudicated in the Industrial Court without reference to the 
Industrial Relations Department and the Minister.
In fact, in other jurisdictions an aggrieved workman who believes that his dismissal was unfair or unjustifiable, may 
refer his grievance directly to the tribunal or court for adjudication. The UK Employment Rights Act 1996, s 94(1) for 
example provides that an employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer and s 111 further 
provides that a complaint may be presented to an employment tribunal against an employer by any person that he 
was unfairly dismissed by the employer. Likewise, in New Zealand Employment Relations Act 2000, s 102 provides 
that an employee who believes that he or she has a personal grievance such as unjustifiable dismissal, may file his 
grievance with the Employment Relations Authority. It is obvious from the above, that the proper forum to filter out 
frivolous cases is the court or the tribunal that will exercise its power only in plain and obvious cases and  only 
where it can be clearly seen that the claim is on the face of it obviously unsustainable. Hence, it is submitted that 
the decision of the superior courts on the waiver of domestic inquiry in an impending dismissal is reasonable and 
sound provided that all claims for dismissal without just cause or excuse is referred directly to the Industrial Court, 
bypassing the Industrial Relations Department and the Minister.
 CONCLUSION
Workplace misconduct refers to the conduct of an employee which is inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his 
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or her duties, or any breach of the express or implied duties of an employee towards his employer. Whether or not 
the misconduct warrants dismissal is determined with reference to the nature and degree of the alleged 
misbehaviour; its significance in relation to the employer and to the position held by the employee; its effect on the 
confidential relationship between the parties as against the severe consequence of dismissal; and misconduct must 
be such that it goes to the heart or root of the contract between the parties.
Prior to the superior court’s decision in Dreamland Corporation (M) Sdn Bhd v Choong Chin Sooi & Anor,49 and in 
Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd and another appeal,50 the absence of a domestic 
inquiry in an impending dismissal was considered fatal, resulting in the dismissal being without just cause or 
excuse. In the above cases however, it was held that failure to hold a domestic inquiry or a defective inquiry was a 
mere irregularity curable by de novo proceedings before the Industrial Court. The decision in the above cases had 
been followed by the Industrial Court in numerous of its awards. The approach taken by the superior courts as 
above is akin of endorsing the common law master and servant principles namely, that where an employee had 
committed gross misconduct the employer may summarily dismiss the employee with no obligation to reveal the 
reason for the  dismissal.51 The employer may even rely on the reasons for dismissal discovered subsequent to the 
dismissal.52 The employer will only be required to justify the dismissal when the case is referred to the Industrial 
Court during which time the employee would be accorded the right to be heard.
It is submitted that without holding a proper inquiry in an impending dismissal due to an alleged misconduct would 
make the parties feel that the conciliation meeting at the Industrial Relations Department is insignificant. Instead of 
becoming a forum for amicable settlement of the dispute, the conciliation meeting would become a mere hurdle for 
the parties to pass through before the same could be referred to and adjudicated by the Industrial Court. In addition 
to the above, even the minister who has the prerogative under s 20(3) of the IRA would not be able to decide 
effectively whether the representation merit reference to the Industrial Court. Hence, the Minister’s reference of the 
representation under the IRA to the Industrial Court would become a merely procedural formality in bringing the 
dispute to the court.
Undoubtedly, the superior courts’ approach in Dreamland Corporation and Wong Yuen Hock’s may be justified if 
there is an automatic reference of dismissal cases to the Industrial Court. It would then become the function of the 
Industrial Court to determine whether the dismissal was with or without just cause or excuse and whether the 
employee was given sufficient opportunity to be heard to satisfy the rules of natural justice. As aptly noted by Raja 
Azlan Shah CJ (as he then was) in Goon Kwee Phong v J & P Coats (M) Bhd:53 ‘Where representations are made 
and are referred to the Industrial Court for enquiry, it is the duty of that court to determine whether the termination or 
dismissal is with or without just cause or excuse. If the employer chooses to give a reason for the action taken by 
him, the duty of the Industrial Court will be to enquire  whether that excuse or reason has or has not been made out. 
If it finds as a fact that it has not been proved, then the inevitable conclusion must be that the termination or 
dismissal was without just cause or excuse. The proper enquiry of the court is the reason advanced by it and that 
court or the High Court cannot go into another reason not relied on by the employer or find one for it’.
 
As a final remark it is also worth noting the observation by Chief Justice Dickson54 that 'Work is one of the most 
fundamental aspects in a person’s life, providing the individual with a means of financial support and, as 
importantly, a contributory role in society. A person’s employment is an essential component of his or her sense of 
identity, self-worth and emotional well-being'. The above statement perhaps sheds light and holds true that that 
misconduct can be argued in the context of human frailty that is couched upon the premise that no behaviour is 
good or bad in it however it is the consequences that have been spawned by the organisation that will consider 
being good or bad. However, at the same time no excuses ought to be given for gross misconduct as the work 
place requires workers to be emotional resilient. In moderation, the rule of law in the practice of proper response in 
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the perils of bad behaviour that most likely will result in misconduct must be crafting contractual terms that will 
produce a more unambiguous formalisation of an employment relationship.
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